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Attorneys for Respondents

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CHEVRON OIL COMP ANY, doing business
as STANDARD OIL COMP ANY OF
CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
BEAVER COUNTY, a legislative corporation
of the State of Utah, et al.,

Case No.
11,317

Def end.ants and Respondents.
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMP ANY, a
Delaware corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
BEAVER COUNTY, a legislative corporation
of the State of Utah, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11,318

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants adopt the plaintiffs' statement of facts
with minor exceptions which are neither substantial nor
material to a proper understanding of the points of law
involved. They proceed to add additional facts, some
of which are without any support whatever in the record.
This extraneous matter consists of statements that the
(•ommercial zone in the county has been extended several
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hundred feet further to the north since the zomng map
was adopted and that at the time of the trial there
existed in this commercial zone five service stations, two
restaurants and two petroleum storage plants, including
one of Phillips Petroleum Company, and that a portion
of a motel has, since the trial, been constructed in the
conunercial zone. Respondents cite no evidence or other
part of the record to support the alleged statements, and
appellants deny the correctness of them.
Another entirely unsupported statement is that since
the trial, the State Highway Department and the Bureau
of Public Roads have changed their policy and re-designed the interchanges at both ends of Beaver City so
to enable traffic in either direction to both leave and
return to the freeway and proceed in either direction
when returning to the freeway; that this highway rearrangement will permit easy access to and from the
freeway at each end of Beaver City at least equal to
the access at Pine Creek Hill; that Beaver City is now
in the process of annexing to its corporate area the
property contained in the present commercial zone north
of Beaver City as well as additional properties to the
interchange, and that it is virtually certain that such
annexation will be completed in the near future. Just
what bearing these unsupported assertions have upon
the question whether the zoning ordinance confiscates
the plaintiffs' property or is arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable is not pointed out. We will C'ornrnent on
this later.
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Our statement that no other property in the country
has such access to the interstate freeway as the plaintiffs' property is justified by the evidence (R. 166-7),
and Exhibits 14 and 15 do not indicate the contrary.
Whether the stated fact is correct is not of controlling
importance.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
ZONING RESOLUTION
Respondents nowhere deny that the zoning resolution confiscates the plaintiffs' property. They rely on
the proposition that the zoning power vested in them is
plenary and that the ordinance must he sustained if there
is a debatable question whether it has any tendency at
all to promote the public welfare.
The contention is in the very teeth of the decisions
of both this Court and the Supreme Court of the United
Ntates which have repeatedly held that the zoning power
cannot he exerted to deprive a property owner of substantially all of the economic or profitable use of his
i1roperty even if the public welfare demands the restriction.
Respondents are unable to differentiate the present
case from the cases cited in our opening brief. The controlling circumstances in the cited cases are exactly parallel to those in the present case. The deciding factor
in all of them is that highway construction or commercial
or industrial development in the neighborhood has given
1o the property a new and greater utility, which the
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zoning n'striction has prevented the property owner from
realizing. In all of the cited cases, the new utility arose
after the enactment of the ordinance. The case at bar
is a clearer case of confiscation than the cited cases ht'·
cause the new utility was in existence or certain to come
into existl'nce in a hrief period when the ordinanct> was
enacted. In addition, the present ordinance was l'nacted
for the express purpose of enabling the town of Beaver
to monopolize freeway-created bm;iness.
It is irrelevant that the ordinance does not prevent
the use to which the property was previously adapted.
'I1he important consideration is that the prior adaptabilit)·
has been superseded by a higher economic and profitahle
use.

Ko legal significance can be attached to the severance of plaintiffs' property from larger tracts. It is also
irrelevant when the property was acquired. Zoning is
not concerned with either title or ownership, past or
present, as this Court has so clearly pointed out in
Gibbons and Recd Company vs. North Salt Lake City,
cited in our opening briPf. The case of Clmsud i-s. [(ensington, 255 N.Y.2d 411 is also a well reasoned decision
in point. The ordinance would confiscate the property
even if the plaintiffs had acquired the entire tracts and
regardless of the date of the conveyance.
The respondents n~ly on Dowse vs. Salt Lake City as
a controlling authority on the constitutional question.
Because of the totally different circmnstances, the two
cases are not in the same ballpark. The DowsP property
consisted of a small corner lot in Nalt Lah City ancl
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was z;oned residential in accordance with a carefully de;;;igw•d master plan. The mtire block in which it was
l<watPd was zoned residential, as well as the block to the
~outh and the one to the southeast. The complaint alleged
that the Dowse property was unsuitable for residential
property, but the undisputed physical facts revealed the
contrary. Since the ordinance did not prevent substantially all profitable and economic use, it did not violate
constitutional guaranties. Plaintiffs' property is located
iu the middlP of the desert, twenty-one miles from any
habitation or other structure within Beaver County. An
iutPrstate freeway has converted it from a goat pasture
into a very valuable commercial site. If the plan adopted
hy the planning commission and by the zoning commis;;ion had heen carried out, it would have been classified
as Highway St>r'Vice Zone property. The Dowse property
was classifif'd in compliance with a master plan for the
zoning of Salt Lake City.
'l'lw d0cision in the Dowse case rests squarely on
the proposition that zoning authorities are vested with
!Pgislative power to fix the boundaries of the different
zones. Courts will not judicially alter or extend these
boundaries unless the zoning board has acted arbitrarily
or um·pasonabl~'· In the circumstances surrounding the
Dowl'e property, there was no basis for a finding that
tliP hoard acted arbitrarily or discriminatively. Whether
the ordinancP df'prived Dowse of all or substantially all
(·f·onomic or profitable use "·as not considered or passed
upon. lt was manifrst that thP ordinance had no such
l'l'l'uet.
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Neither docs Gayland 1·s. Salt Lake Co111ity afford
the respondents any support. Hf>rc the property owner
attacked the ordinance upon the ground that no mastrr
plan was adopted and that the commission based its
refusal to rezone tlw property upon protests and objections by neighboring property owuers. No evidence was
offered or received in the trial court on the question
whether the ordinance confiscated the plaintiff's property
or whether it was arbitrary, capricious or discriminator)·.
In this posture of the case, the only questions presented
in the Supreme Court were whether the adoption of a
master plan was a condition precedent to the validity of
the ordinance, and whether the commission could properly base its refusal to amend the ordinance upon
its own knowledge, information, investigation and
study. l\ o such problems are presented in the case
at bar. Plaintiffs have never contended that the
present ordinance is i1ffalid because 110 master plau
"..-as adopted. Likewise, plaintiffs do not contend that
the zoning authorities may not properly consider an»
information pertinent to the inquiry regardless of how
they acquire it. 'Vhat the plaintiffs do contend is that
the evidence which they introducPd in the trial court
establshes as a matter of law that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it deprives them of substantially all
economic or profitable use of their property and is arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory.
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It is true, as respondents contend, that the freeway
doH not deprive the plaintiffs' property of its suitability

for grazing purposes any more than Highway U.S. 91
did. ·what the freeway did was to add an important
appendage to plaintiffs' property. U.S. 91 did nothing
for plaintiffs' property. It is accessible at any point and
passes through cities and towns. The freeway extends
from coast to coast, is non-accessible except at intervals
and by-passes all cities and towns.

THE ZONING RESOLUTION IS CAPRICIOUS,

DI8CRIMINATORY AND VOID, AND THE
BOARD ACTED ARBITRARILY IN
REFUSING TO AMEND IT

Respondents cite several cases in support of the
proposition that this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of zoning authorities on the question
whether the restriction is required to promote the public
welfare in situations where the issue is debatable. The
proposition is well settled and we do not controvert it.
1'1w problem lies in applying it to the facts and circumstances involved in the particular case.
All parties are now agreed that the restriction on
th<> usP of plaintiffs' property cannot be sustained unless
it promotes the public welfare in a substantial and reali~tic manner. \Ve have demonstrated in our opening
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brief, and it is not controverted hy respondents, that if
the restriction confiscat<>s th<' plaintiffs' property, it is
void, even though the public welfare requires it.
Rt>spondents argtw that unless the restriction is sustained, economic conditions in the town of BPaver will
deteriorate and that any substantial reduction in business activity in or near the town will cause a loss of
service and facilities requirt>d to sustain community life.
·we are told that what is in the best intt>rests of the
inhabitants of the incorporated areas is also in the best
interests of the inhabitants of the unincorporated area,
as each is dependent upon the other. This we submit
is a confession that blockading business activity at Pine
Creek Hill is detrimental not only to the best interests
of the nnincorporated ar<>as, bnt also the incorporated
areas. It demonstrates that the ordinance is discriminatory as a matter of law.
It is impossible to reconcile defendants' denial that
the ordinance was designed to eliminate competition and
its contention that plaintiffs' activities at Pine Creek
Hill will dangeronsly diminish husiness activity in the
town of Beaver. TherP is no escape from the conclusion
that tlw design and pnrpose of this ordinance was to
funnel the freeway-generated husiness into the town.
Ther<:> is no other objectiw which it could accomplish.
The unincorporated area of Beaver County is a desert.
There is nothing npon which the legitimate functions of
zoning can operate. Restricting the use of propert:v in
this barren territory is a uwre pretext for protecting
local business interests. Such legislation finds no support in the statute, and is unla"·fnl.
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N eitlwr the Gayland cas<• nor the Dowse case can
L<' tort nred into ]ff Peeden ts for the proposition that elimination of competition is a legitimate function of zoning.
The argument that plaintiffs have been invited to
establsh new facilities in the commercial area near the
town shows that the ordinance was not intended to eliminate competition is unfounded. Additional facilities in
this small commercial zone would not serve the freeway
motorist any better than the present established facilities
in the town. The freeway by-passes this small commercial area just as it by-passes the town of Beaver.
It is the greatly increased traffic which will com<'
into Beavt>r County over the intt>rstate freeway, particnlarl>· after I-70 is completed, that creates the business
which plaintiffs hope to capture at Pine Creek Hill and
which the ordinance seeks to funnel into the town. It
is a clear case of eliminating business competition by thr
vehicle of zoning.

The evidence in this case is convincing that the town
of Bt>avPr cannot captnre the freeway-oriented business
hy preventing plaintiffs' activities at Pine Creek Hill.
Because the freeway by-passes the town of Beaver, the
business appurtenant to the frpeway will also by-pass the
town.
Defendants have apparently become aware of this
situation since the trial of the case. They inform lls
that they have persuaded the highway authorities to con~truct an interchange opposite the town of Beaver so as
to intercept the business which is on its wa>' to Cedar
City and points beyond.
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The position of the town of Beaver is more unenviable than that of the dog in the manger. It is not only
unable to capture the freeway business by blockading it
at Pine Creek Hill, but actually diverts it to points
beyond the county, to the economic detriment of the
entire area. Every tourist dollar captured at Pine Creek
Hill is hay in the barn, not only for the town of Beaver,
but the entire county.
Respondents' argument with respect to possible reduction in tax base and increased government costs which
would result from plaintiffs' proposed development rests
on an exceedingly slender thread. It is without factual
foundation and is in conflict with the undisputed evidence. It is entirely speculative and fanciful.
Respondents admit that the proposed project at Pine
Creek Hill will increase the tax base of the county. The
attempt to convince the court that this increase will be
offset fails because the evidence does not support it.
Respondents' theory that the releasing of plaintiffs'
property from the restriction will undermine stability
and set an evil precedent of zoning is unique. In practice, defendants' theory means that property uses should
be frozen and that future economic progress should be
halted. This is not the theory of lawful zoning which
considers every piece of property in connection with
its own surrounding circumstances and that changes in
these circumstances require changes in the restrictions
upon its use. Neither zoning nor rezoning has any legiti-
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mate concern with precedent or what the past history of
the property has been. It looks only at the present and
to the future.
Respondents' assertion that there is no public need
for commercial facilities at Pine Creek Hill finds no
support in any of the evidence. The uncontradicted evidence establishes the contrary.
It is a matter of common knowledge that I-15 is a
non-access freeway. Motorists demand freeway-oriented
service. The zoning experts who testified in tlus case
agree that it is essential to the health, safety and convenience of motorists that roadside supplies and services
he available at intervals along the freeway. Plaintiffs,
who are engaged in the business of serving the motoring
public, have decided that Pine Creek Hill is an excellent
site. They are so convinced of it that they are willing
to invest large sums of money in the venture. What
better evidence is available on this point than that of
persons having vast experience in furnishing these services in all western states? Furthermore, qualified experts, who have made careful surveys of business conditions in the area, are in accord that Pine Creek Hill
is ideally located to serve the needs of the motoring
public.

A feeble attempt is made to cope with plaintiffs'
proposition that in adopting the ordinance a legislative
determination was made that the public \Yelfare demanded that plaintiffs' property be classified as Highway Service Zone property. They know or should know
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that rezoning property can hP aeeomplished only by
amending the ordinance and that tlw ordinance cannot
be amended Pxcept by notieP and }waring. Tt is an insult
to ordinary intelligence to say, as the author of the
ordinance does, that the provision was made for the
Highway ServicP Zone in the original ordinance because
it would facilitate future classification of property in
that zone. The present brief of rPspondents has abandoned this explanation. Dcfendants now say that the
only legislative determination made when the ordinance
was adopted was that thPre might be a need at some
future time for a highway service facility along a frreway sevPra1 miles from an existing community; that the
decision of whether or not to creak a highway service
zone and how many was lPft for future determination.
rl_1he short answer to this flimsy Pxplanation is that the
ordinance contains no sud1 provisions. It creates a highway serYice zone then and there, and nothing is deferred
for any future detPrrnination or considPration. Respondents are attf~mpting to amend the zoning plan and other
provisions of the ordinance by parol.
The faintPst item of support for the zoning. restriction is that plaintiffs do not need any ontlPts at Pine
Creek Hill and that thPy ean supply the nePds of the
public from the outlets which they already haw. Defendants seem to have the imvression that they arc' emlJOwered to exPrcis<• the functions of appellants' hoards
of directors. \V c an' also told that the proposPd operations will result in financial loss. '!'his is a rather striking examph• of tlw dPfrndants' total disn•gard for the
lin-1itations plaeed h~- tlH' l<•gislature on tlH• po,n•rs of
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r.onmg authorities. It is not at all surprising that defrndants had no hesitancy in confiscating the plaintiffs'
property. They assume their zoning powers are completely unrestricted. Neither the Constitution of the
rnited States nor the Constitution of the state were
gin•n the slightest consideration in framing the zoning
n·solntion now under attack.

CONCLUSION
The zoning resolution imposes a restriction on the
plaintiffs' property which deprives them of all economic
or profitahle use thereof. No corresponding public benefit is derived from the restriction. On the contrary, the
n•striction is positively detrimental to the public good
lwcause it prevents the establishment of a substantial
commercial development which would produce much
neeth'd employment and revenue practically free of
diarge of government expense. The ordinance is unlawfully designed and enacted to capture and control the
iww hnsiness which will flow from the traffic upon the
intt>rstate freeway and divert it into a single, small community which is not ewn within the area subject to the
zoning law. It is discriminatory on its face. It is arbitrar~' and unreasonable because it does not accomplish
any public benefit. It deprives the motoring public of a
~e1Tice which is essential to health, safety and convenIPllCC,

The pre-trial order framed no issues of fact, and
tl1np tll'P no conflicts in the evidence upon any controlling
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matter. The trial court made no findings of fact and
its judgment should be vacated with directions to enter
judgment as prayed for in the complaints.
Respectfully suhmitted,
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Salt Lake City, Utah
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Attorneys for Appellant
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